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Abstract 
This paper studies how unemployment and employment durations for immigrants and 
natives respond differently to changes in the economic conditions due to the 2008 crisis and 
to the receipt of unemployment benefits when the economy declines. Using administrative 
data for Spain, we estimate multi-state multi-spell duration models that disentangle 
unobserved heterogeneity from true duration dependence. Our findings suggest that 
immigrants are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions, both in terms of 
unemployment and employment hazards. Moreover, the effect of the business cycle is not 
constant but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. The results also 
point to a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, which is 
stronger for immigrants but only at the beginning of the unemployment spell and mainly during 
good times (before the 2008 recession). Finally, we find evidence of a positive effect of 
unemployment benefits on subsequent employment duration, but only for native workers with 
temporary contracts. Nonetheless, this effect vanishes as workers qualify again for 
unemployment benefits. 
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1 Introduction
The economics literature concerning immigration has shown that there are rel-
evant differences between the labor market performance of native and foreign-
born individuals. Several papers have investigated how employment and unem-
ployment probabilities and welfare participation rates differ between natives and
immigrants (see Baker et al., 1995, Chiswick et al., 1997; Uhlendorff and Zim-
mermann, 2006; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003). Another
strand of the literature has studied how immigrants respond to the economic
cycle compared to natives. For instance, Barth et al. (2006) examine the rela-
tionship between local labor market conditions and the wages of immigrants and
natives in the US, finding that the wages of immigrants are more sensitive to
local labor market conditions than the wages of natives. Dustman et al. (2010)
compute unemployment rates and mean wage differentials between natives and
immigrants in Germany and the UK and find larger unemployment responses
for immigrants relative to natives and little evidence that wage responses are
different.
This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on unemployment and
employment durations. Specifically, we investigate how immigrants and na-
tives respond differently to changes in the economic conditions due to the 2008
“Great Recession” and to the receipt of unemployment benefits when the econ-
omy declines. The duration framework allows us to account for dynamic aspects
of individuals’ labor market behavior, which is important because workers’ re-
employment prospects tend to deteriorate the longer they are unemployed (Ab-
bring et al., 2002) and firms’ recruiting decisions also depend on candidates’
unemployment duration (Viswanath, 1989).
The consequences of the severe worldwide economic downturn in the late
2000’s is an issue of social and political concern. Analyzing whether the nega-
tive effects on unemployment and employment durations are more pronounced
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among the immigrant relative to the native workforce might be also useful for
the design of immigration and welfare policies. Moreover, accounting for differ-
ences in business cycle effects for immigrants relative to natives has important
implications for the measurement of the relative economic performance of im-
migrants. As Barth et al. (2006) note, the assumption made in some empirical
studies that period effects are equal for natives and immigrants may lead to
severe bias in estimates of assimilation effects.
With the emergence of the great recession unemployment insurance design
is also in the heart of the political debate. In this paper we analyze the poten-
tial disincentive effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment duration
and its potential beneficial effect on subsequent employment duration. As Tat-
siramos (2009) note, the latter effect could be important because the receipt
of unemployment benefits may improve the matching of the unemployed to job
vacancies and, therefore, may increase subsequent employment stability. Thus,
from a policy point of view it seems that the analysis of unemployment insur-
ance systems should account for the net effect of unemployment benefits on the
labor market behavior of different groups of workers.
Spain is an interesting case for investigating these issues because it is one
of the European countries where immigration flows have increased the most
noticeably during the last decade. The foreign-born population living in Spain
surged from approximately 600 thousand (1.5% of the total population) in 1998
to more than 5.7 million (12.2% of the total population) in 2011. These figures
are among the largest in Europe.1 Moreover, Spain faces one of the highest
unemployment rates in the E.U: In 1996, the male unemployment rate stood at
almost 18%, which then decreased for ten years, falling to 6% in 2006, and then
shot up again to 20% in 2011.
Our empirical analysis is performed using administrative data, the Contin-
1Smaller countries such as Luxembourg and Cyprus experienced similar rates in certain
periods.
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uous Sample of Working Histories, which contains information on the complete
employment history of a sample of approximately 1, 2 million workers registered
with the Social Security Administration during the period 2000-2011. This data
set has two features that are crucial for our purposes. First, the sample period
covers the pre-recession (up to 2008) and the recession years, which allows us
to assess the effect of changes in the economic conditions. Second, this data-
set offers information on multiple spells of unemployment and employment for
the same individuals.2 This information is crucial for disentangling unobserved
heterogeneity, which could give rise to spurious negative duration dependence,
from genuine duration dependence (see Heckman, 1991).
Concerning econometric methods, we estimate multi-state multi-spell dis-
crete time duration models for male immigrants and natives separately. Specif-
ically, we estimate unemployment and employment hazards by maximum likeli-
hood, assuming that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is discrete
with finite support (see Heckman and Singer, 1984). As with panel data mod-
els, the support-point approach with multiple spells improves the identification
of the parameters of interest with respect to the single-spell case.3 Moreover,
it allows for a flexible specification of the unobserved heterogeneity, because
it is possible to allow for dependence between the unobservable variables that
influence both unemployment and employment durations.
Our results indicate that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in eco-
nomic conditions, both in terms of unemployment and employment hazards.
Moreover, the effect of the economic cycle is not constant but decreases with
duration at a higher rate among immigrants. The results also point to a dis-
incentive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, which is
stronger for immigrants but only at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
2Hansen (2000) and Kalwij (2010) also use multiple spell data to study individuals’ unem-
ployment experiences.
3See Abbring and van den Berg (2003).
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For immigrants the disincentive effect of benefits is more important during the
expansionary period, that is, before 2008. Finally, we find evidence of a positive
effect of unemployment benefits on subsequent employment duration, but only
for native workers with temporary contracts. Nonetheless, this effect vanishes
as workers qualify again for unemployment benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some
relevant features of the Spanish labor market and the data. Section 3 formulates
the econometric model and discusses the estimation procedure. Section 4 reports
and discusses the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Some Stylized Facts and Data Description
The evolution of unemployment and employment rates for immigrants and na-
tives in Spain is shown in Table 1. The evidence from the Labor Force Survey
(LFS) shows that throughout the period 2000-2007 the unemployment rates
among male immigrants were on average approximately 4 percentage points
(p.p.) higher than for natives. However, the difference increases to 15 p.p. on
average during the period 2008-2011. Table 1 also indicates that unemployment
tends to be longer for natives than for immigrants, although the differences
between the groups decrease during the recession (2008-2011).
As for the employment rates, it is well known that Spain’s government has
strongly promoted temporary contracts with the purpose of increasing labor
market flexibility and reducing unemployment (See Dolado et al, 2002, for ex-
ample). Several labor market reforms have been aimed at fighting the preva-
lence of temporary employment, but they have not been very successful. Table 2
shows that the share of temporary workers among natives is on average approx-
imately 33% of employees, while among immigrants, this proportion increases
to 55%. Regarding the duration of employment spells, immigrants have shorter
durations than native workers, both in temporary and permanent employment.
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The impact of immigration on the cost of welfare has also been extensively
studied in the literature.4 This paper focuses on the receipt of unemployment
benefits. Unemployed workers in Spain are covered by two successive benefits:5
a contributory unemployment insurance benefit and then an assistance bene-
fit. Unemployment Insurance can be paid to a registered unemployed person
aged 16-64, who is actively seeking work, and who did not leave her previous
job voluntarily. Unemployment Assistance grants income to those 16 to 64
year-old workers with dependents and income below a certain threshold, who
have exhausted their entitlement to contributory benefits and to those with no
entitlement to contributory benefits, but who paid contributions for at least
3 months. Data from the LFS indicate that the use of unemployment bene-
fits among immigrants has increased considerably since 2006, reaching amounts
similar to those for natives, especially in 2010 (45.6% for both groups). Between
2006 and 2011, the increase for natives has been 12 p.p., while for immigrants
the increase has been approximately 26 p.p.
2.1 The Data
We use Spanish administrative data from the Continuous Sample of Working
Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL, in Spanish). It is
a representative sample of the population registered with the Social Security
Administration in the reference year (so far, from 2004 to 2011). The raw data
represent a 4% random sample of the reference population (pension earners,
unemployment benefit recipients, employees, and self-employed workers) that
amounts to approximately 1,2 million individuals each year.
The main characteristic of the MCVL is that it offers retrospective informa-
tion. Therefore, we have information on the entire labor history of the workers
registered with the Social Security Administration during the year the sample
4For Spain, Rodriguez-Planas (2013) finds that immigrants are less likely to participate in
social assistance programs, and are more likely to receive unemployment insurance when the
crisis hits.
5For a detailed description see Bentolila and Jimeno (2006).
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is extracted. Moreover, this data-set has a longitudinal structure from 2005 to
2011, meaning that an individual who is present in a wave and remains regis-
tered with Social Security stays as a sample member. In addition, the sample
is refreshed with new entrants, which guarantees the representativeness of the
population in each wave. In our estimates, we use the last six waves (2006-
2011),6 so that only those workers without a connection to the Social Security
Administration during at least one day in the last six years are excluded from
our sample.
Although we can reconstruct the labor market histories of the individuals
in the sample back to 1980, some relevant characteristics, such as the type of
contract, are missing for pre-2000 spells. Moreover, sample representativeness
tends to be less accurate as one goes back in time (see Bonhomme and Hospido,
2012, for details). Therefore, we only use observations for the period 2000-2011.
This means that the spells that end before 2000 are dropped from our sample,
and we use only the 2000-2011 monthly observations for spells that started
before 2000 and are ongoing after 2000.
We exclude from our sample workers who are not enrolled in the general
regime of the Social Security Administration.7 We keep male workers for whom
the first observation (first spell of employment) is before the age of 30 (35
in the case of immigrants). This age selection maximizes the probability of
not having missing employment spells in the sample, and, hence, allows us
to compute the exact entitlement to unemployment benefits for each of the
observed unemployment spells.8 For these individuals, we observe their labor
market history up to age 49. Finally, we select male workers to avoid the problem
6The first wave is not fully comparable to the others and the 2005 wave is not used in order
to reduce the size of the data set.
7 In Spain, less than 20% of workers are enrolled in other regimes, including some civil
servants, workers in the agricultural sector, and the self-employed. These categories of workers
follow different rules in regard to the use of unemployment benefits and are excluded from our
sample.
8This is crucial to maintain the assumption about the exogeneity of the benefit process in
our empirical model.
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of non-participation present in many women’s labor histories. We select a 10%
random sample to ease the computational burden. After filtering the sample
(see Appendix A), we end up with a sample of 32,586 natives, which comprises
115,449 unemployment spells9 and 176,504 employment spells10 . Regarding
immigrants,11 we end up with a sample of 4,601 individuals with 16,712 and
21,064 unemployment and employment spells, respectively.
In our data, we identify periods of non-employment using information on
the dates in which a firm does not pay Social Security contributions for the
worker. Those non-employment spells in which the worker receives unemploy-
ment benefits are clearly identified as unemployment spells. However, we cannot
distinguish between non-employment spells that correspond to periods of un-
employment without benefits and periods of inactivity. We consider all these
spells as unemployment spells. Thus, the duration of unemployment for those
who exit from unemployment to inactivity is the sum of the duration of the
initial unemployment spells and the duration of the spells out of the labor force,
as in Tatsiramos (2009).12 Unemployment spells longer than 24 months and
employment spells longer than 42 months are treated as right-censored, due to
the relatively small number of observations.
The explanatory variables used in the estimations are described in Appen-
dix A and summary statistics are presented in Table 3. As is often the case
with administrative data, the main shortcoming is the lack of some individual’s
characteristics, such as marital status or number of children. Another caveat is
that we cannot measure the educational level of the worker, but only the job
qualification. Table 3 shows that more than 31% of natives in our sample re-
9Only unemployment spells with durations of longer than 15 days are considered because
in Spain, shorter durations correspond generally to job-to-job transitions.
10Only employment spells longer than 30 days are considered.
11We consider immigrants to be those individuals who reside in Spain but have a different
nationality from the European Union (as of 1995) countries.
12He performs a sensitivity analysis, treating these spells as right-censored unemployment
spells, and finds similar results.
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ceive contributive unemployment benefits13 when starting their unemployment
spells, with lower rate for immigrants (approximately 26%). The same dynamic
is observed for employment spells: 38% of employed natives receive benefits in
the previous unemployment spell, while this rate falls to 30% for immigrants.
Average unemployment duration for completed spells is lower for immigrants
(3.30 months) than for natives (3.97 months).14 Immigrants also have smaller
employment durations than natives (6.29 versus 6.94 months).
2.2 Empirical Hazards
To obtain an idea of the shape of the distribution of unemployment and em-
ployment durations, we look at the empirical hazards. That is, we compute the
number of exits from unemployment (employment) in each month divided by
the population still in unemployment (employment) at the beginning of that
month.
Figure 1, which refers to unemployment spells, shows the empirical hazard
for two distinct periods: pre-recession (2000-2007) and recession (2008-2011).
This figure confirms the strong decrease in the hazard of leaving unemployment
during the first six months. For both natives and immigrants, the hazard rate
for the pre-recession period is higher than for the recession period, up to the
first year in unemployment. Moreover, the influence of the recession seems to be
stronger among immigrants. For instance, an immigrant who remained unem-
ployed for at least 5 months has a probability of leaving unemployment during
that month of 16.4% in 2000-2007 and 8.8% in 2008-2011, as opposed to 12.9%
and 8.5% for a native.
As to the employment hazard, it is crucial to distinguish between permanent
and fixed-term employees. Figure 2 shows that there is no duration dependence
13The unemployment spells with unemployment assistance benefits have been censored from
the first month they are received because in many cases these spells correspond to periods
of inactivity for the long-term unemployed older than 52 who typically link the end of this
benefit receipt with their retirement period.
14 In our sample there is a larger proportion of short unemployment spells than in the LFS,
which makes sense given the quarterly structure of the Spanish Labor Force Survey.
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for permanent contracts, while for fixed-term contracts there is a negative du-
ration dependence with spikes in the exit rate around the time of contract
exhaustion (6, 12, 24 and 36 months).
Figure 3 presents the unemployment empirical hazard by unemployment
benefits receipt. The differences between the hazard lines are larger among
immigrants only for the first 6-10 months of unemployment. For example, at the
fifth month of unemployment, the hazard rates for the average native without
and with benefits are 12.2% and 8.6%, respectively. These figures are 12.7%
and 8.0% for the average immigrant. After 10 months, the difference between
the hazard rates of recipients versus non-recipients is still approximately 6 p.p
for natives, whereas for immigrants the difference drops to less than 1 p.p.
Finally, Figure 4 presents the empirical unemployment hazards by time to
benefits exhaustion. The hazards of those individuals without unemployment
benefits are similar to those for individuals for whom benefits exhaustion is close
(1 to 3 months), while among workers with more time before exhausting benefits,
the hazard rates are lower up to the end of the first year of unemployment.
3 Empirical Models
We analyze the dependence of the exit from unemployment (employment) on
the length of time unemployed (employed) and on other economic variables by
the estimation of duration models. At any point in time, an individual may be
in any of two states: unemployed (u) or employed (e). We estimate hazard rates
between both states for natives and immigrants separately by estimating the
probability that an individual will leave unemployment (employment) during
the next period, given that she has been unemployed (employed) for T periods.
This framework is consistent with the theories of job search (Mortensen, 1977)
and job matching (Jovanovic, 1979).
We treat duration (T ) as a discrete variable. Thus, the probability of a spell
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being completed by time t+1 given that it was still continuing at time t is given
by
hk(t) = Pr(T = t | T ≥ t, bk(t), xk(t)) =
= F (αk0(t) + α
k
1(t)b
k(t) + αk2(t)x
k(t) + αk3(t)b
k(t)xk(t)),
where k = u, e refers to unemployment or employment spells. For the em-
ployment hazard we allow for a differential effect of all explanatory variables
depending on whether the worker has a temporary or a permanent contract.
Therefore, we include among the regressors a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
individual has a temporary contract and its interaction with all the conditioning
variables in the model.
The analysis is also conditional on bk(t), a set of variables that capture
whether the worker receives unemployment benefits and his benefit entitlement.
In the exit from employment, these variables refer to the previous unemployment
spell.
It is important to note that the exact benefit entitlement duration is available
in our data. In contrast to other studies, this variable is not censored, so the
benefit indicator variable can be treated as strictly exogenous and not as a
predetermined variable. For instance, in Bover et al. (2002) and Tatsiramos
(2009) the exact benefit duration is not observed. What they do observe is
whether the benefit entitlement is as long as the unemployment duration. This
leads to a lack of strict exogeneity of the benefit indicator and to the necessity
of treating this variable as endogenous or predetermined, depending on whether
unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. In our case, the hazards can be
conditioned on the exact and known benefit entitlement and we do not need to
allow for feedback from T to future values of b.
We also condition on a vector of variables xk(t), that includes a set of indi-
vidual, sectorial and aggregate variables, some of which are time invariant, while
others, such as business cycle conditions, are time-varying. αk0(t) is a parameter
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that captures duration dependence and is a function of the number of periods
spent in unemployment or employment. αk1(t), α
k
2(t) and α
k
3(t) are also func-
tions of t and capture interaction effects between duration and the conditioning
variables. Finally, F (·) denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function,
F (z) = e
z
(1+ez) .
3.1 Single-Spell Duration Models and Unobserved Het-
erogeneity
For each individual, our data consist of one or more spells of unemployment
and employment. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider first the estimation of a
single spell duration model that treats different spells for the same individual
as independent, which would be a reasonable assumption in the absence of
unobserved heterogeneity. Then, the log likelihood function for all spells of
unemployment (employment) would take the form
logLk =
N
k
i=1
t
k
t=1

(1− ykit) log(1− h
k
i (t)) + y
k
it logh
k
i (t)

, (1)
where Nk is the number of unemployment (employment) spells in the sample,
t
k
is the largest observed duration, and yk
it
takes the value 1 if an exit from the
spell of unemployment (employment) is observed in period t and 0 if not or if
the observation is censored at t.
The model could be estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML).15 Nonetheless,
ML estimates of previous model may be biased by the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity. Such unobserved heterogeneity is likely to decrease the effect of
benefits and to introduce spurious negative duration dependence. A version of
the model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, ηk, would be given by
hk(t, η) = Pr(T = t | T ≥ t, bk(t), xk(t), ηk) =
F (αk0(t) + α
k
1(t)b(t) + α
k
2(t)x
k(t) + αk3(t)b
k(t)xk(t) + ηk).
15Since the hazard rate hk
i
(t) in the likelihood function is a logit probability, estimation is
equivalent to estimating a sequence of logit models (with cross-equation restrictions) defined
on the surviving population at each duration (see Jenkins, 1995).
11
Again, assuming that the transitions across unemployment and employment
are independent, the log-likelihood function is
logLk =
N
k
i=1
 tk
t=1

(1− yk
it
) log(1− hk
i
(t)) + yk
it
loghk
i
(t)

dµ(ηk
i
), (2)
where µ(ηk
i
) is the unknown distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity for
each type of spell (unemployment or employment).
3.2 Multiple-Spell Duration Models
The availability of data on multiple spells for the same individual allows to
improve the identification of the parameters of interest in a duration model
in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, when several spells of
employment and unemployment are observed for each individual, it is possible to
relax the assumption of independent spells and to allow for correlation across the
spells of unemployment and employment. Specifically, we can jointly estimate
the unemployment and employment hazards assuming a joint distribution for
the unobserved heterogeneity in each state.
The problem of how to control for the unobserved mixing distribution µ(η)
has been addressed extensively in the literature (see Van den Berg, 2001). Heck-
man and Singer (1984) propose controlling for unobserved heterogeneity without
explicitly specifying a parametric distribution for heterogeneity. They adopted a
semi-parametric approach to identify the unobserved distribution from a mixed
distribution assuming that η is a random effect independent of all individual
characteristics, although correlated with α0(t). For discrete duration models,
the only assumption is that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity has
a finite mean.16
We follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and consider that ηu and ηe follow
a bivariate discrete distribution and where both ηu and ηe have two location
16The performance of estimators that approximate the distribution of unobserved hetero-
geneity by means of a discrete distribution is studied by, among others, Huh and Sickles
(1994), Baker and Melino (2000) and Gaure et al. (2007)
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points. Thus, the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is specified with
four points of support (su1 , s
e
1), (s
u
1 , s
e
2), (s
u
2 , s
e
1), (s
u
2 , s
e
2) with the correspond-
ing joint probabilities: P11 = Pr(η
u = su1 , η
e = se1), P12 = Pr(η
u = su1 , η
e =
se2), P21 = Pr(η
u = su2 , η
e = se1), and P22 = Pr(η
u = su2 , η
e = se2).
17 There-
fore, there are four types of individuals who differ in their unemployment and
employment hazards: individuals with high exit rates both from unemployment
and employment, individuals with high exit rates from unemployment and low
exit rates from employment, individuals with low exit rates from unemployment
and high exit rates from employment, and individuals with low exit rates from
both states.18 For identification, without a constant term in the model, we
estimate the four mass points and three free probabilities.
Thus, the joint likelihood function is given by
logL =
N
i=1
2
l=1
2
m=1
logLi(s
u
l , s
e
m)Pr(η
u
i = s
u
l , η
e
i = s
e
m),
where logLi(s
u
l
, se
m
) takes the following form:
logLi(s
u
l
, se
m
) =
t
t=1

[uit {(1− y
u
it
) log(1− hu
i
(t, su
l
)) + yu
it
log hu
i
(t, su
l
)}] +
[(1− uit) {(1− y
e
it
) log(1− he
i
(t, se
m
)) + ye
it
loghe
i
(t, se
m
)}]

,
(3)
and uit equals 1 if a spell of unemployment is observed during the period t and
zero otherwise.
As with linear panel data models, identification of the distribution of the
random effects is facilitated by the presence of multiple spells for each individ-
ual. This panel aspect of the data allows identification under less demanding
conditions relative to the single-spell case (see Abbring and van der Berg, 2003,
and van der Berg, 2001). For example, while covariates are essential for identifi-
cation in single-spell models, multiple-spell models can be identified even if there
17Belzil (2001) also uses a bivariate discrete distribution with two points of support to study
the effect of UI benefits duration on the quality of subsequent job duration using single spell
data.
18Notice that this distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is more flexible than the one
in Tatsiramos (2009) who assumes two mass points (su
1
, se
1
) and (su
2
, se
2
) with probabilities P1
and P2.
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are no covariates (see Honoré, 1993). Nonetheless, the presence of covariates in
a multi-spell duration model can help improve the identification. Specifically,
identification is aided by the fact that we have time-changing explanatory vari-
ables in all types of spells (see Eberwein et al., 1997).
4 Estimation Results
In this section, we report the estimates for the joint likelihood for unemployment
and employment durations, accounting for correlated unobserved heterogeneity
as specified in equation 3, for natives and immigrants separately.
The effect of economic conditions is captured by the yearly regional em-
ployment growth rate.19 For the unemployment hazard, the effect of benefits is
captured by an unemployment benefit receipt indicator and by a set of variables
that capture the time before exhausting the benefits receipt (1 to 3, 4 to 6, and
7 to 12 months). As previously indicated, it is crucial to condition on the bene-
fit entitlement (or its opposite, the time before exhausting the benefits receipt)
because it allows us to treat the benefit indicator variable as strictly exogenous.
We also allow for an interaction between unemployment benefits receipt and log
duration.
For the employment hazard the effect of benefits is captured by a dummy
variable which equals 1 for those workers who received benefits in the previous
unemployment spell interacted with the entitlement period (1 to 6 or 7 to 24
months). The motivation is to capture a differential effect depending on the
potential available time to find a job.20 We also interact the previous variable
with a dummy indicating whether the duration of the current employment spell
was between 6 and 12 months. The motivation in this case is to capture potential
increases in the hazard rate as workers qualify again for unemployment benefits.
19Alternatively, aggregate effects are measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1
if the observation corresponds to the period 2008-2011 and 0 otherwise (these estimates are
available upon request).
20Tatsiramos (2009) within a similar framework interacts the benefit dummy with previous
unemployment duration, because he can not construct the exact benefit entitlement.
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The estimates of the effect of economic conditions and benefits are presented
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, followed by the results for the distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity and, finally, by the estimates of the effect of duration
and other characteristics. The impact of the variables is discussed in terms
of the sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients as well as
in terms of the predicted hazards for leaving unemployment and employment
at different durations. The predicted hazards are computed for each point of
support of the heterogeneity distribution and then weighted using the estimated
probabilities for each point.
4.1 Economic Conditions
Table 4 presents estimates of the economic conditions for both unemployment
and employment hazards. As previously discussed, it is captured by the yearly
regional employment growth rate. We allow for an interaction of this variable
with log duration and with the unemployment benefit receipt indicator and
sectorial dummies for the unemployment and employment hazards respectively.
Our results point to a positive effect of favorable economic conditions on
the hazard of leaving unemployment. This positive effect is not constant and
decreases with duration21 (notice the negative coefficient on the interaction be-
tween the employment growth rate and log dur). A comparison of the size of the
coefficients between natives and immigrants shows that the effect of the busi-
ness cycle is larger for immigrants and that the decreasing effect with duration
is also larger for immigrants.
Table 6 presents the predicted unemployment hazards for different dura-
tions evaluated at the mean employment growth rates for two distinct states of
the business cycle, before the crisis (before 2008) and afterwards.22 In accor-
dance with previous estimates, the effect of the economic conditions is larger
21These results are in line with Bover et al. (2002).
22The mean employment growth rate during the first period is 3.72%, while in the second
it is -2.90%.
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among immigrants. For instance, the difference in predicted hazards between
the expansionary and the recession period at the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell is almost 10 p.p. for natives without benefits and almost 16 p.p. for
immigrants. After 6 months in unemployment these figures are approximately 4
p.p. for natives and 7 p.p. for immigrants. After 12 months in unemployment,
the differences for immigrants and natives are similar.
As to the employment hazard, Table 4 shows that the exit rate from em-
ployment is smaller during the expansion, and again this effect decreases with
duration. Our separate estimates for temporary and permanent workers show
that favorable economic conditions mainly decrease the probability of leaving
permanent employment. Similarly to the unemployment hazard, we find that
the effect of the economic cycle is stronger among immigrants than natives, but
for immigrants it decreases more rapidly with employment duration.
Predicted hazards from Table 7 show that the difference in the employment
hazard rates between the recession and the expansion at the beginning of the
spell for a permanent worker without benefits in the previous unemployment
spell is approximately 0.35 p.p. for a native and 2 p.p. for an immigrant. After
6 months in employment these figures are approximately 0.25 p.p. for natives
and 1.20 p.p. for immigrants.
There also appears to be significant differences across sectors. Table 4 shows
that for workers in construction the negative effect of favorable economic condi-
tions in the employment hazard is the largest, both for immigrants and natives.
For instance, the difference in the predicted hazards between recession and ex-
pansion periods, after 6 months of temporary employment in the industry sector
is approximately 4.6 and 6 p.p for natives and immigrants, respectively, while
in the construction sector, this figure is between 5.6 and 8 p.p. for natives and
immigrants, respectively.
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4.2 Unemployment Benefits
Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates of the unemployment benefit variables.
As is standard in the literature, our results indicate that the receipt of unem-
ployment beneftis reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment. The comparison
of the size of the coefficients shows that this effect is stronger among immigrants,
although it decreases with duration at a higher rate than for natives. We also
find that the disincentive effect of benefits increases when economic conditions
improve, but this effect is statistically significant only for immigrants (see the
coefficient of the interaction between receiving unemployment benefits and the
employment growth rate in Table 4). The disincentive effect of benefits decreases
when the time to exhausting benefits receipt approaches (1 to 3 months).
The overall effects of all these interactions and the rest of variables included
in the model in the predicted hazard are shown in Table 6, which presents the
predicted unemployment hazard for individuals who do not receive unemploy-
ment benefits and for those who do receive them. We consider two different
cases: one in which the benefit entitlement is 6 months, and another in which
the benefit entitlement is 18 months.23 The difference between the hazard for
an immigrant without and with benefits and with an unemployment duration of
1 month and entitlement period of 18 months is approximately 10 p.p. higher
than for a comparable native during the expansion. As unemployment dura-
tion increases, this difference decreases; when the unemployment duration is 6
months, the difference between immigrants and natives is approximately 2 p.p.
Therefore, we find a stronger disincentive effect of benefits for immigrants but
only at short unemployment durations.
For the employment hazard, we find a negative impact of having received
benefits during the previous unemployment spell only for native temporary
23Note that in this table the variable “time to exhausting” is implicit given the corresponding
value of the entitlement and the unemployment duration. For instance, when the worker is in
his first month of unemployment and has access to 6 months of entitlement, time to exhausting
is equal to 5 months
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workers. For temporary immigrants, we do not find any significant effect, while
for permanent workers we find that having received benefits with a long benefit
entitlement (from 7 to 24 months) increases the hazard of being fired. There-
fore, we only find evidence of the so called “matching effect” of unemployment
benefits receipt for temporary native workers.
Interestingly, our results not only note the importance of distinguishing be-
tween temporary and permanent contracts but also the importance of account-
ing for the current employment duration. Specifically, estimated coefficients
from Table 5 show that the negative effect of previous unemployment benefits
for temporary native workers disappears and becomes positive for those workers
whose current employment duration is between 6 and 12 months. That is, when
the worker becomes eligible again for unemployment benefits there is a spike
in the probability of leaving employment. The predicted hazards reported in
Table 7 give a magnitude of these effects. A temporary native after 6 months
in employment and who received unemployment benefits with a benefit entitle-
ment of 6 or 12 months exhibits a hazard in employment 4 p.p. higher than
a non-recipient, while at the beginning of the employment spell this figure is
approximately 1 p.p. lower.
4.3 Other Effects
4.3.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity
As previously discussed, the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is
specified with four mass points (su1 , s
e
1), (s
u
1 , s
e
2), (s
u
2 , s
e
1), (s
u
2 , s
e
2), with proba-
bilities P11 = Pr(ηu = su1 , η
e = se1), P12 = Pr(η
u = su1 , η
e = se2), P21 = Pr(η
u =
su2 , η
e = se1), and P22 = Pr(η
u = su2 , η
e = se2). Since the model does not include
a constant term, the four mass points are identified.
Table 8 shows that of the four unobserved types of workers we have allowed
for, the probability of the type with high exit rates both from unemployment
and employment is the lowest, especially among natives (9.2% and 14.1% for
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natives and immigrants, respectively). Moreover, the probability of having high
unemployment and low employment exit rates is approximately 33% for natives
and 36% for immigrants. The probability of the type with the “worst” charac-
teristics (low unemployment and high employment hazard rates) is almost 32%
for natives and 33% for immigrants.
4.3.2 Duration Dependence
Table B1 in Appendix B reports the coefficient estimates for duration depen-
dence and for the other characteristics included in the model. For the unem-
ployment hazard, duration dependence is parameterized using a third order
polynomial in log t. For the employment hazard, we capture duration depen-
dence with the log of duration, because we did not find any significant effect of
non-linearities. For temporary contracts, we also include a set of dummy vari-
ables to capture the effect of being fired when the contracts usually end (at 6,
12, or 36 months). As previously indicated, additional effects of duration are
captured by introducing as regressors the interactions of certain variables with
logged duration. In the unemployment equation, we find a negative duration
dependence in all cases. In the employment equation, we find a weaker dura-
tion dependence for permanent workers than for temporary workers. Moreover,
for temporary workers there are spikes in the employment hazards during the
months that fixed-term contracts usually end (at 6, 12, and 36 months).
4.3.3 The effect of other characteristics
In the unemployment hazard, the estimated effect of age shows that the unem-
ployed who are above 30 years old have lower exit rates from unemployment,
and this effect is stronger as duration increases. The age effect is also stronger
among natives than immigrants. The more educated, with a temporary or
part-time contract and working in the construction sector during the previous
employment spell, are more likely to leave unemployment.
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The specification in the employment hazard includes a dummy for a previous
unemployment spell of 1-6 months. Once we control for all the rest of variables,
short previous unemployment experience is associated with lower hazard out
of employment for temporary native workers. For permanent natives, short
unemployment duration increases the hazard for subsequent unemployment.24
For immigrants, we do not find any significant effect of previous unemployment
duration. Younger, more educated and full-time workers are less likely to exit
employment. There is a large positive effect on the employment hazard for
permanent workers in the construction sector, especially if they are immigrants.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate how immigrants and natives respond differently to
changes in the economic conditions due to the 2008 “Great Recession” and to
the receipt of unemployment benefits when the economy declines. We focus on
unemployment and employment durations as outcomes. A potentially different
response of immigrants would have important implications for immigration and
welfare policy as well as for the analysis of the assimilation process of immigrants
in the host country.
Our findings suggest that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in eco-
nomic conditions than natives, both in terms of unemployment and employment
hazards. The positive effect of favorable economic conditions on the unemploy-
ment hazard and its negative effect on the employment hazard is not constant,
but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. This indicates
that, although as in line with previous literature (see Barth et al., 2006, or Dust-
man et al., 2010), we find that immigrants are more sensitive to the economic
cycle, they are able to react more quickly than natives to adverse economic
conditions. Moreover, the hypothesis presented by Dustman et al. (2010) that
24This result is similar to that found by Tatsiramos (2009) for Spain and Italy.
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the stronger reaction of immigrants’ unemployment to the economic cycle can
be explained by higher job separation rates is also corroborated by our results,
since we find that the predicted employment hazard rates are higher for immi-
grants than for natives, even after controlling for observable and unobservable
characteristics.
Our results also point to a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on
unemployment duration. This result is in line with the literature (see, for in-
stance, Bover et al., 2002, or Tatsiramos, 2009). We add further evidence on
the differential effect for immigrants and natives. We find that for immigrants
the disincentive effect of benefits on unemployment exit rates is larger than for
natives but only at the beginning of the spell. This could indicate that the
possible policy concern about the immigrants’ use of public transfers should be
checked. Moreover, we find that the disincentive effect of benefits decreases as
time to exhausting the benefits approaches and, only for immigrants, increases
when economic conditions are better.
Finally, we find evidence of a positive effect of unemployment benefits on
subsequent employment duration, but only for native workers with temporary
contracts. This result is in line with Tatsiramos (2009) who, using a sample of
European countries, finds that there is a beneficial effect and that it is larger in
countries with relatively more generous unemployment insurance systems. We
add further evidence for Spain accounting for a differential effect for temporary
versus permanent workers and for immigrants versus natives and we only find
evidence of the “matching effect” for temporary native workers. Nonetheless,
even this effect vanishes when current employment duration is between 6 to 12
months; that is, when the worker becomes again eligible to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. This result is consistent with that of Rebollo-Sanz (2012), who
finds that when an employee again qualifies for unemployment benefits, there is
a spike in the probability of leaving employment. From a policy perspective, this
21
result suggests that the design of the unemployment insurance system should
account for potential distortions on firms’ and workers’ behavior.
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Appendix A: Sample selection and variables definition
Table A1. Sample Selection
Natives Immigrants
No. Individuals (initial sample) 595,454 67,675
No. Individuals dropped due to:
Age below 18 or above 49 51,475 3,290
Age of the fist job larger than 30 (natives) or 35 (immigrants) 60,850 15,515
Working in agriculture and self-employment 237 216
missing information regarding occupation 6,512 45
entering into unemployment before 1997 105,022 284
duration of unemployment/employment bellow 15/30 days 45,467 2,299
No Individuals (final sample) 325,871 46,016
Table A2. Variables Definition
Variable Name Definition
UB∗ The worker receives unemp. benefits
Time to exhausting UB∗ No of months until UB are exhausted
UB entitlement∗ No of months the worker is entitled to receive UB
∆ Empl. rate Annual and regional growth rate of employment
Sector of activity∗∗ Industry, Construction,
Non-market services, Market services
Age 18-30, 31-44, 45-49.
Job Qualification∗∗ High, Intermediate, Low
Fired Non voluntary exit from the previous job
Big firm∗∗ Firm with more than 250 workers
New Firm∗∗ Created 12 or less months before the worker was hired
Private firm∗∗ Firm is not public
Temporary H. Agency∗∗ Coming from a Temporary Help Agency
Type of contract∗∗ Permanent or Temporary
Part-time∗∗ Part-time employment
Total empl. No months of previous employment
Country of origin Latin-America, Asia, EU-15, USA and Canada
new east EU countries (all EU countries not belonging to the EU15),
rest of European countries
Regularization The first spell for the immigrants observed in a
regularization year (2000, 2001 and 2005)
∗In the current spell for the unemp. hazard; in previous unemp. spell for the empl.
hazard. ∗∗In the current spell for the empl. hazard; in previous empl. spell for the
unemp. hazard.
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Appendix B: Additional estimation results
Table B1. Joint Estimates of Logistic Hazards for Leaving Unemployment and
Employment
Leaving Unemployment
Natives Immigrants∗∗
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Duration
log Dur -2.194 0.030 -1.712 0.081
(log Dur)2 1.184 0.027 0.817 0.077
(log Dur)3 -0.231 0.006 -0.182 0.019
Individual Characteristics
Age 31-44 -0.148 0.018 -0.045 0.036
Age 45-49 -0.585 0.034 -0.107 0.182
Age 31-44× logDur -0.078 0.009 -0.012 0.024
Age 45-49× logDur -0.097 0.017 0.075 0.110
High Qualification 0.050 0.019 -0.066 0.077
Interm. Qualification 0.120 0.014 0.149 0.036
High Qualif.× logDur -0.001 0.012 0.005 0.054
Interm. Qualif.× logDur -0.012 0.009 -0.055 0.026
Total empl. 0.038 0.001 -0.035 0.006
Conctract and firm Charact.∗
Big firm 0.100 0.014 0.036 0.056
New firm -0.026 0.011 -0.036 0.026
Private firm 0.445 0.031 0.605 0.177
Permanent contract -0.340 0.015 -0.208 0.038
Part time employment -0.229 0.012 -0.238 0.038
Fired 0.150 0.012 0.067 0.030
Temporary H. Agency 0.255 0.015 0.429 0.053
Sector∗ and Quarterly Dummies
Industry 0.050 0.014 -0.001 0.046
Construction 0.149 0.012 0.068 0.030
Non-market services 0.025 0.025 -0.403 0.125
First quarter 0.251 0.011 0.347 0.030
Second quarter 0.481 0.011 0.342 0.031
Third quarter 0.270 0.011 0.240 0.030
∗In the previous employment spell. ∗∗The hazard function includes dummies for region
of origin and regularization year.
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Table B1 (cont.). Joint Estimates of Logistic Hazards for Leaving Unemploy-
ment and Employment
Leaving Employment
Permanent Empl. Temporary Empl.
Natives Immigrants
∗
Natives Immigrants
∗
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Duration
log Dur -0.152 0.023 -0.072 0.045 -0.316 0.009 -0.152 0.022
Dur. Empl. 6 months 0.734 0.018 0.573 0.044
Dur. Empl. 12 months 1.178 0.026 0.993 0.072
Dur. Empl. 36 months 1.030 0.084 1.026 0.284
Dur previous unem. spell 1-6 m. 0.257 0.040 -0.079 0.115 -0.125 0.015 -0.087 0.048
Individual Characteristics
Age 31-44 1.019 0.071 0.155 0.134 0.404 0.022 0.137 0.043
Age 45-49 3.222 0.126 0.447 2.334 1.145 0.043 1.009 0.228
Age 31-44× logDur -0.047 0.025 0.027 0.054 0.004 0.011 -0.004 0.027
Age 45-49× logDur -0.138 0.045 0.586 0.724 0.054 0.021 -0.225 0.140
High Qualification -0.439 0.079 0.247 0.209 -0.443 0.027 -0.325 0.102
Interm. Qualification -0.254 0.076 0.331 0.139 -0.102 0.019 -0.066 0.045
High Qualif.× logDur -0.031 0.030 -0.128 0.086 -0.056 0.015 0.035 0.062
Interm. Qualif.× logDur 0.065 0.029 -0.111 0.057 -0.007 0.011 0.043 0.029
Total empl. -0.159 0.003 -0.374 0.016 -0.074 0.001 -0.091 0.006
Conctract and firm Charact.
Big firm -0.497 0.046 -0.382 0.145 -0.177 0.019 -0.227 0.068
New firm 0.235 0.027 0.431 0.061 0.061 0.013 0.149 0.029
Private firm -0.013 0.159 -0.888 0.652 0.094 0.039 -0.025 0.180
Part time employment 0.396 0.037 0.227 0.077 0.215 0.016 0.154 0.044
Temporary H. Agency -0.413 0.112 0.132 0.480 0.014 0.022 -0.090 0.068
Sector and Quarterly Dummies
Industry -0.221 0.035 -0.008 0.091 -0.089 0.020 -0.083 0.049
Construction 0.248 0.037 0.432 0.074 0.035 0.015 0.069 0.033
Non-market services -0.371 0.084 -0.324 0.301 -0.131 0.033 -0.080 0.135
First quarter -0.012 0.033 -0.135 0.075 -0.318 0.014 -0.393 0.035
Second quarter -0.040 0.033 -0.112 0.074 -0.142 0.014 -0.205 0.032
Third quarter -0.014 0.033 -0.101 0.073 0.130 0.013 -0.118 0.032
No Obs. 2,195,099 231,996
Joint Log-likelihood -429,779.98 -62,731.69
∗The hazard function includes dummies for region of origin and regularization year.
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Table 1: Unemployment Rates and Unemployment Duration (months)
U. Rates U. Duration
Natives Immig. Natives Immig.
Year 1-6 m. 6-12 m. +12 m. 1-6 m. 6-12 m. +12 m.
2000 9.11 13.02 42.14∗ 15.66 38.78 55.89 18.25 20.73
2001 7.39 11.98 40.83 16.18 34.19 59.91 13.09 22.52
2002 8.13 14.47 44.07 16.56 32.64 52.70 12.64 28.53
2003 8.02 13.01 45.34 16.39 31.39 46.27 15.94 27.94
2004 7.50 10.20 41.79 18.40 31.73 48.57 14.38 28.72
2005 6.46 8.18 47.82 12.78 27.38 66.51 9.61 11.60
2006 5.65 8.81 50.37 11.64 24.53 65.71 13.40 7.88
2007 6.09 11.22 53.29 11.44 21.21 64.10 12.42 9.97
2008 11.27 21.89 57.59 15.46 19.44 66.55 15.71 11.06
2009 15.82 33.15 38.69 21.60 34.48 42.91 25.33 28.17
2010 17.65 31.99 30.69 17.15 46.76 34.80 15.29 45.11
2011 19.88 36.52 30.05 15.07 50.86 28.50 18.04 48.48
Source: Labour Force Survey, 4th term.
*Percentage of unemployed per group and year.
Table 2: Temporary Employment Rates and Employment Duration (months)
Temporary Employment Permanent Employment
Temp. Emp. Rates Temp. Emp. Duration Perm. Emp. Duration
(1-12 m.) (1-12 m.)
Year Natives Immig. Natives Immig. Natives Immig.
2000 31.58 54.67 80.17∗ 85.08 9.78 28.12
2001 31.04 58.21 74.81 82.01 8.76 32.14
2002 30.10 57.71 74.68 78.73 8.38 29.23
2003 29.39 58.34 74.66 73.93 8.27 24.96
2004 29.13 61.28 75.13 68.57 8.70 23.84
2005 29.74 58.87 82.64 84.13 12.90 35.58
2006 29.79 59.89 81.75 83.30 14.85 39.45
2007 27.60 54.23 81.39 80.35 15.08 35.79
2008 25.19 50.22 80.97 81.41 12.47 31.25
2009 22.01 43.96 81.26 80.86 9.16 23.15
2010 21.98 41.28 79.53 84.02 8.74 20.31
2011 22.35 42.73 79.19 84.20 8.19 17.89
Source: Labour Force Survey, 4th term.
*Percentage of employed per group and year.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Unemployment Spells Employment Spells
% Natives % Immig. % Natives % Immig.
With Unemployment Benefits 31.20 26.51 38.37 30.50
Sector: Agriculture 0.74 0.79 1.31 1.29
Industry 12.59 8.72 15.94 9.94
Construction 28.61 48.03 28.36 45.61
Non-market services 8.04 2.12 9.32 2.10
Market services 50.02 40.34 45.07 41.06
High qualification 15.17 4.92 22.14 6.13
Intermediate qualification 35.86 31.23 38.03 32.33
Low qualification 48.97 63.85 39.83 61.54
Age 18-30 61.05 51.33 56.73 55.13
Age 31-44 32.28 47.76 37.74 44.25
Age 45-49 6.67 0.91 5.53 0.62
Fired 83.79 75.88 67.32 66.04
Big Firm 12.08 5.67 13.25 5.88
New Firm 19.53 28.79 20.83 27.76
Coming from a Temp. Help Agency 17.48 8.58 14.12 7.26
Permanent contract 11.79 11.85 25.72 18.08
Part-time employment 15.87 13.05 11.12 12.49
Total empl. (months) 87.39 36.03 112.75 37.87
Private firm 93.94 98.62 92.48 98.72
Region of origin
Africa 38.09 35.12
Latin-America 32.17 33.90
Asia 7.80 8.49
EU-15, USA and Canada 4.63 4.73
New EU countries 14.18 14.50
Rest of Europe 3.13 3.27
Average Duration (months)∗ 3.97 3.30 6.94 6.29
No of Spells 115,489 16,712 176,504 21,064
% of Censored Spells 15.9 19.8 67.7 52.6
No of individuals 32,586 4,601
*Only for compelted spells.
31
Table 4: Effect of economic conditions on unempl. and empl. hazards
Natives Immigrants
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Unemployment
∆ Empl. rate 0.067 0.002 0.105 0.005
∆ Empl. rate× logDur -0.009 0.001 -0.018 0.003
∆ Empl. rate×Receiving UB -0.001 0.003 -0.064 0.010
Permanent Employment
∆ Empl. rate -0.037 0.008 -0.079 0.016
∆ Empl. rate× logDur 0.003 0.003 0.020 0.006
∆ Empl. rate×Industry -0.044 0.008 -0.061 0.020
∆ Empl. rate×Construction -0.081 0.008 -0.079 0.015
∆ Empl. rate×Non-market serv. 0.006 0.017 0.004 0.052
Temporary Employment
∆ Empl. rate -0.032 0.002 -0.056 0.006
∆ Empl. rate× logDur 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.003
∆ Empl. rate×Industry -0.021 0.004 -0.030 0.011
∆ Empl. rate×Construction -0.061 0.003 -0.038 0.006
∆ Empl. rate×Non-market serv. 0.008 0.004 0.064 0.022
Table 5: Effect of unemployment benefits on unempl. and empl. hazards
Natives Immigrants
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Unemployment
Receiving UB -1.209 0.024 -1.445 0.097
Receving UB× logDur 0.183 0.017 0.329 0.053
Time to exhaust. UB 1-3 m. 0.595 0.031 0.609 0.115
Time to exhaust. UB 4-6 m. -0.051 0.029 0.090 0.104
Time to exhaust. UB 7-12 m. -0.039 0.026 -0.100 0.098
Permanent Employment
Received UB×UB Entitl. 1-6 m. 0.020 0.072 0.224 0.164
Received UB×UB Entitl. 1-6 m×Empl.dur. 6-12 m. 0.015 0.135 0.082 0.287
Received UB×UB Entitl. 7-24 m. 0.406 0.050 0.784 0.169
Received UB×UB Empl.dur. 6-12 m.×Empl.dur. 6-12 m. -0.095 0.087 0.232 0.277
Temporary Employment
Received UB×UB Entitl. 1-6 m. -0.099 0.023 0.042 0.055
Received UB×UB Entitl. 1-6 m×Empl.dur. 6-12 m. 0.389 0.037 0.224 0.096
Received UB×UB Entitl. 7-24 m. -0.069 0.021 0.081 0.065
Received UB×UB Empl.dur. 6-12 m.×Empl.dur. 6-12 m. 0.271 0.034 0.139 0.111
Note: Joint estimates of the unemployment and employment hazards, allowing for
correlated unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 6: Predicted Unemployment Hazards for a Reference Individual.
Natives Immigrants
Unempl. Duration (months) Unempl. Duration (months)
1 6 12 18 1 6 12 18
Period 2000-2007
Not Receiving UB 46.73 16.56 13.26 9.67 54.62 20.41 12.89 7.94
(0.26) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.78) (0.57) (0.52) (0.47)
Receiving UB 21.30 13.23 13.26 9.67 21.12 16.86 12.89 7.94
(Entitl. 6 m.) (0.35) (0.27) (0.15) (0.15) (1.03) (1.05) (0.52) (0.47)
Receiving UB 22.12 8.09 6.81 9.10 19.73 10.16 7.41 10.04
(Entitl. 18 m.) (0.40) (0.18) (0.19) (0.32) (1.57) (0.93) (0.74) (1.24)
Period 2008-2011
Not Receiving UB 36.84 12.54 10.27 7.55 38.69 13.79 9.00 5.67
(0.31) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.77) (0.38) (0.31) (0.29)
Receiving UB 15.04 9.76 10.27 7.55 17.14 11.18 9.00 5.67
(Entitl. 6 months) (0.30) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13) (0.83) (0.63) (0.31) (0.29)
Receiving UB 15.68 5.85 5.07 6.95 15.96 6.53 4.33 5.68
(Entitl. 18 months) (0.33) (0.13) (0.14) (0.25) (1.30) (0.58) (0.37) (0.63)
Notes: The reference individual has the mean values of the sample variables for natives
and immigrants. St. errors (between brackets) calculated by simulation from the
empirical distribution of the parameters.
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Table 7: Predicted Employment Hazards for a Reference Individual.
Natives Immigrants
Empl. Duration (months) Empl. Duration (months)
1 6 12 18 1 6 12 18
Period 2000-2007
Permanent contract
Not Received UB 0.67 0.51 0.45 0.43 2.07 1.93 1.88 1.86
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.64) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60)
Received UB 0.68 0.52 0.47 0.44 2.57 2.61 2.54 2.31
(Entitl. 6 months) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.91) (1.02) (1.00) (0.81)
Received UB 1.00 0.69 0.62 0.64 4.40 5.14 5.02 3.96
(Entitl. 18 months) (0.41) (0.17) (0.18) (0.30) (1.52) (1.90) (1.87) (1.35)
Temporary contract
Not Received UB 12.98 14.70 17.52 5.59 9.23 13.34 17.97 7.39
(1.08) (1.21) (1.41) (0.52) (3.22) (4.44) (5.71) (2.66)
Received UB 11.93 18.56 21.90 5.10 9.59 16.65 22.11 7.68
(Entitl. 6 months) (1.02) (1.51) (1.73) (0.48) (3.35) (5.42) (6.77) (2.77)
Received UB 12.24 17.31 20.50 5.25 9.92 16.03 21.35 7.95
(Entitl. 18 months) (1.04) (1.41) (1.63) (0.49) (3.46) (5.29) (6.64) (2.86)
Period 2008-2011
Permanent contract
Not Received UB 1.02 0.75 0.66 0.62 4.17 3.12 2.79 2.61
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (1.28) (0.94) (0.85) (0.82)
Received UB 1.04 0.77 0.69 0.63 5.15 4.19 3.75 3.24
(Entitl. 6 months) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (1.72) (1.58) (1.43) (1.10)
Received UB 1.52 1.02 0.90 0.93 8.64 8.11 7.29 5.52
(Entitl. 18 months) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (2.73) (2.84) (2.59) (1.80)
Temporary contract
Not Received UB 17.05 18.92 22.20 7.40 13.45 16.57 20.94 8.52
(1.35) (1.47) (1.68) (0.67) (4.44) (5.28) (6.37) (3.01)
Received UB 15.74 23.54 27.32 6.76 13.94 20.48 25.53 8.85
(Entitl. 6 months) (1.29) (1.78) (1.99) (0.63) (4.60) (6.31) (7.32) (3.14)
Received UB 16.13 22.06 27.70 6.95 14.39 19.75 24.69 9.16
(Entitl. 18 months) (1.30) (1.68) (1.90) (0.64) (4.73) (6.18) (7.30) (3.25)
Notes: The reference individual has the mean values of the sample variables for natives
and immigrants. St. errors (between brackets) calculated by simulation from the
empirical distribution of the parameters.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity Parameters.
Natives Immigrants
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Support Points
su1 -0.673 0.040 -0.712 0.189
su2 -1.787 0.038 -1.729 0.188
se1 -2.639 0.175 -1.109 0.665
se2 -3.682 0.175 -1.947 0.666
Probabilities
P11 0.077 0.006 0.128 0.028
P12 0.291 0.008 0.313 0.032
P21 0.312 0.011 0.365 0.042
1− P11 − P12 − P21 0.320 0.193
35
Figure 1: Empirical Unemployment Hazards, by period
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Figure 2: Empirical Employment Hazards, by period
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Figure 3: Empirical Unemployment Hazards and Unempl. Benefits Receipt
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Figure 4: Empirical Unemployment Hazards and Time to Exhaust. Benefits
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